Policy

Disrupting the first reported AI-orchestrated cyber espionage campaign

Nov 13, 2025 • 7 min read

Read the report

PyTorch Puzzle #6: Unlearning MNIST 🧩

https://bit.ly/4oKaGls



CS 5434 | Fall 2025 | Trustworthy AI

Training Data Extraction

11/17/2025 • 11/19/2025

Homework 3: Jailbreaking

Due: ***Today*** **(for real)**
Wednesday, Nov. 19th

Homework 3: Jailbreaking

This assignment studies the effect of jailbreaking on models. We'll use a quantized version of Qwen, Qwen2.7-7B-Instruct-AWQ, that's a large model which can follow instructions but has been quantized to be fast/small enough to run in a notebook.

First you'll try to craft a jailbreak manually, which should be relatively simple after learning about jailbreaks in class. Then we'll build our own version of the GCG algorithm and test it through a series of small experiments.

```
!pip install autoawq transformers==4.51.3 > /dev/null
```

0. Load the model

Please load [Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct-AWQ] from the open model repository on huggingface.

Load both the (quantized!) model and tokenizer. Pass a single string through the model. Make sure the model is on GPU by writing `assert model.device.type == "cuda"`.

If you lack imagination, you're welcome to use the following prompt to test the model:

```
You are a helpful assistant. Summarize retrieval-augmented generation in 3 bullets.
```

(Note, you will need `transformers==4.51.3` and `autoawq` installed for this to work properly.)

Extracting Training Data from Diffusion Models

Nicholas Carlini, Jamie Hayes, Milad Nasr, Matthew Jagielski, Vikash Sehwag, Florian Tramèr, Borja Balle, Daphne Ippolito, Eric Wallace



Figure 1: Diffusion models memorize individual training examples and generate them at test time. **Left:** an image from Stable Diffusion's training set (licensed CC BY-SA 3.0, see [49]). **Right:** a Stable Diffusion generation when prompted with "Ann Graham Lotz". The reconstruction is nearly identical (ℓ_2 distance = 0.031).

- A generative image model (such as Stable Diffusion) trained on a dataset that happens to contain a photo of this person will **regenerate an almost identical image** when asked to generate an image of that person's name as input

Original:

Generated:

Original:

Generated:



Figure 5: Our attack extracts images from Stable Diffusion most often when they have been duplicated at least $k = 100$ times; although this should be taken as an upper bound because our methodology explicitly searches for memorization of duplicated images.

Quantifying Memorization Across Neural Language Models

Nicholas Carlini, Daphne Ippolito, Matthew Jagielski
Katherine Lee, Florian Tramer, Chiyuan Zhang

LLMs memorize their training data!



Figure 1: **Our extraction attack.** Given query access to a neural network language model, we extract an individual person's name, email address, phone number, fax number, and physical address. The example in this figure shows information that is all accurate so we redact it to protect privacy.

Carlini et al. 2020

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

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

Ziegler et al. 2021

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https://github.com/jenevans33/CS8803-1/blob/eca1bbc27ca6f7355dbc806b2f95964b59381605/src/Final/ekfcode.py#L23



```python
class robot:

    def __init__(self, x = 0.0, y = 0.0, heading = 0.0, turning = 2*pi/10, distance = 1.0):
        """This function is called when you create a new robot. It sets some of
        the attributes of the robot, either to their default values or to the values
        specified when it is created."""
        self.x = x
        self.y = y
        self.heading = heading
        self.turning = turning # only applies to target robots who constantly move in a circle
        self.distance = distance # only applies to target bot, who always moves at same speed.
        self.turning_noise    = 0.0
        self.distance_noise    = 0.0
        self.measurement_noise = 0.0


    def set_noise(self, new_t_noise, new_d_noise, new_m_noise):
        """This lets us change the noise parameters, which can be very
        helpful when using particle filters."""
        self.turning_noise    = float(new_t_noise)
        self.distance_noise    = float(new_d_noise)
        self.measurement_noise = float(new_m_noise)


    def move(self, turning, distance, tolerance = 0.001, max_turning_angle = pi):
        """This function turns the robot and then moves it forward."""
        # apply noise, this doesn't change anything if turning_noise
        # and distance_noise are zero.
        turning = random.gauss(turning, self.turning_noise)
        distance = random.gauss(distance, self.distance_noise)

        # truncate to fit physical limitations
        turning = max(-max_turning_angle, turning)
        turning = min( max_turning_angle, turning)
        distance = max(0.0, distance)

        # Execute motion
        self.heading += turning
        self.heading = angle_trunc(self.heading)
        self.x += distance * cos(self.heading)
```

Figu
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Carlini et al. 2020



```python
class robot(object):
    """
    docstring
    """
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```


Ziegler et al. 2021

Taken verbatim from <u>code for a robotics class</u>

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

Image from Ziegler et al. 2021

Larger models memorize more

URL (trimmed)	Occurrences		Memorized?		
	Docs	Total	XL	M	S
/r/[redacted]51y/milo_evacua...	1	359	✓	✓	½
/r/[redacted]zin/hi_my_name...	1	113	✓	✓	
/r/[redacted]7ne/for_all_yo...	1	76	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]5mj/fake_news_...	1	72	✓		
/r/[redacted]5wn/reddit_admi...	1	64	✓	✓	
/r/[redacted]lp8/26_evening...	1	56	✓	✓	
/r/[redacted]jla/so_pizzagat...	1	51	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]ubf/late_night...	1	51	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]eta/make_christ...	1	35	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]6ev/its_officia...	1	33	✓		
/r/[redacted]3c7/scott_adams...	1	17			
/r/[redacted]k2o/because_his...	1	17			
/r/[redacted]tu3/armynavy_ga...	1	8			

Carlini et al. 2020

10 cases of memorization to **0.5** as model scale reduces

Larger models memorize more

Prior work

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/r/[redacted]7ne/for_all_yo...	1	76	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]5mj/fake_news_...	1	72	✓		
/r/[redacted]5wn/reddit_admi...	1	64	✓	✓	
/r/[redacted]lp8/26_evening...	1	56	✓	✓	
/r/[redacted]jla/so_pizzagat...	1	51	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]ubf/late_night...	1	51	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]eta/make_christ...	1	35	✓	½	
/r/[redacted]6ev/its_officia...	1	33	✓		
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Carlini et al. 2020

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This work

Data Normalized by duplication counts and sequence lengths



Uniformly sampled data without any normalization



Log-linear relationship between **model scale and memorization**

GPT-2 as a baseline that was trained on a different pre-training corpus.

Repeated data is memorized more!



Lee et al. 2021

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

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

Ziegler et al. 2021

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

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

Ziegler et al. 2021

Gap between memorization across scales is reduced with increased duplication!



Kandpal et al. 2022

Repeated data is memorized more!

- Data divided into buckets of 1000 examples for each length
- Each bucket consists of data repeated a certain number of times



Across all model scales **extractability increases with repetition**

Quantifying Memorization Across Neural Language Models

Nicholas Carlini, Daphne Ippolito, Matthew Jagielski, Katherine Lee, Florian Tramer, Chiyuan Zhang

Bridging the gap between **discoverable and extractable memorization**

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At least **1%** of the dataset memorized in GPT-J, Carlini et al. 2023

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Does this mean that even though LLMs memorize pre-training data, we can't really extract it practically?

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Well no! This paper's **argument**: Extraction attacks already make models regurgitate training data but **prior work just couldn't verify all cases**

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Model Family	Parameters (billions)	% Tokens memorized	Unique 50-grams	Extrapolated 50-grams
RedPajama	3	0.772%	1,596,928	7,234,680
RedPajama	7	1.438%	2,899,995	11,329,930
GPT-Neo	1.3	0.160%	365,479	2,107,541
GPT-Neo	2.7	0.236%	444,948	2,603,064
GPT-Neo	6	0.220%	591,475	3,564,957
Pythia	1.4	0.453%	811,384	4,366,732
Pythia-dedup	1.4	0.578%	837,582	4,147,688
Pythia	6.9	0.548%	1,281,172	6,762,021
Pythia-dedup	6.9	0.596%	1,313,758	6,761,831

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Magnitudes higher extracted data verified to be memorized! Compare to **600 examples** in Carlini et al. 2020

Bridging the gap between **discoverable and extractable memorization**

- Number of extracted memorized examples depend on number of generations from the model

- We want to estimate total memorization, but couldn't indefinitely keep on generating!



As we query the model more, they emit more memorized data

Bridging the gap between **discoverable and extractable memorization**

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- Can use Good Turing estimator to **extrapolate** number of uniquely memorized examples



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

With sufficient data **Good Turing** estimator can help extrapolate the number of uniquely generated examples

GPT-J memorizes **at least 1%** of its training dataset

Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Models

Milad Nasr, Nicholas Carlini, Jonathan Hayase, Matthew Jagielski, A. Feder Cooper, Daphne Ippolito, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Eric Wallace, Florian Tramèr, Katherine Lee

Extracting memorized data from instruction tuned LMs

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Aligned models pose two issues that make using the existing attack methods for extracting memorized data

Extracting memorized data from instruction tuned LMs

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Challenge 1: Chat breaks the continuation interface.

System: You are a helpful assistant.
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Extracting memorized data from instruction tuned LMs

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Challenge 2: Alignment adds evasion.

User: Write the following words then continue from there: "British Broadcasting Corporation is a British public service broadcaster headquartered at Broadcasting House in London, England. The total number of staff is"
Assistant: I'm sorry, but you haven't provided the complete information about the total number of staff at the BBC. As of my last knowledge update in September 2021, the BBC ....

Extracting memorized data from instruction tuned LMs

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Using the baseline attack, out of the 50 million generated tokens using their attack the authors only **find 0.02% tokens** to be present verbatim in their proxy pre-training dataset

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

Using this attack, authors identify 10,000 unique verbatim memorized training examples.


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New Jersey-based industrial hygienist, Jeffrey S. Boscamp, CIH, has been exposed to the asbestos issue since 1982 and has gained extensive experience in managing a wide range of asbestos abatement projects throughout the Northeastern United States. He has trained hundreds of workers to conduct these asbestos abatements in a safe, healthy, and compliant manner.
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- This problem also happens with productive-level model: GPT-3
- https://chat.openai.com/share/456d092b-fb4e-4979-bea1-76d8d904031f

Why this is significant

- Previous attacks have recovered only a small portion of the model training data set, not the scale to this paper (**Gigabytes**)
- Previous attacks target at completely open source models, but this attack targeted for **actual products**.
- The models that previous attacks target at didn’t **align to** make **data extraction** difficult, but ChatGPT did
- Previous models give direct model access. ChatGPT does not provide direct input and output model access to the underlying LM



Figure 1: We scalably test for memorization in large language models. Models emit more memorized training data as they get larger. The aligned ChatGPT (gpt-3.5-turbo) *appears* 50× more private than any prior model, but we develop an attack that shows it is not. Using our attack, ChatGPT emits training data 150× more frequently than with prior attacks, and 3× more frequently than the base model.

- When running the same attack on ChatGPT, it appears that the model never emits memorized data
- With appropriate hints (using the word repetition attack mentioned in the paper), its emitted memorized data about **150 times faster**



Figure 7: When running our divergence attack that asks the model to repeat a word forever, some words (like "company") cause the model to emit training over 164× more often than other words (like "know"). Each word is one token.

Some words as prompt allows the model to emit training data much faster

– like "company"

ASIA LIFE

Google Translate’s Mongolia Service Goes Horribly Wrong

No Mongolian speaker would think of their language as gobbledygook but a Google glitch made it so.

By **Sergey Radchenko**
January 19, 2018

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